The goal of this article is to consider and analyze the text of a critical but heretofor neglected, document and historical source on the question of Serbian liberation from Ottoman rule and its national unification. The document was written in 1804 during the first months of the First Serbian Uprising against the Ottoman oppression.[i]
The Serbian nation was divided at the dawn of the 19th century by the borders of Ottoman pashaliks and by the state frontiers that separated the lands under Ottoman control from those under the Habsburg Empire. The beginning of the 19th century was a turning point in the history of the Serbs. From that time the modern history of the Serbs and Serbia begins. The birth of modern Serbian history begins with the First Serbian Uprising (1804−1813) when, after three hundred and fifty years of Ottoman rule the Serbs in central Serbia (i. e., from the area of the Beogradski pašaluk)[ii] rose against the Turks. This uprising was the most important, biggest, and most glorious national revolt in Serbian history. However, this historicalal event was meaningful not only for the Serbs who lived within the Beogradski pašaluk but for the entire Serbian population who lived outside of the pashalik and the Ottoman Empire (i.e., in the Habsburg Monarchy). They had a significant interest in the fate of the insurrection. All Serbs, either from the Ottoman Empire or the Habsburg Monarchy, saw the insurrection as a pivotal event in the process of national liberation and unification within the borders of a single national state.[iii]
Stevan Stratimirović, the Karlovci Metropolitan from 1790 to 1836, and the head of the Serbian church in the Habsburg Monarchy, was one of those Serbs dreaming about national freedom, independence and unification. His crucial and most influential political discourse on national emancipation and political consolidation is countained in Memorandum, written in June 1804. However, his central political idea of bringing together all Serbs into a single united national state was not ever realised.
This article proposes answers to four important questions connected with Sratimirović’s plan to liberate and unite all Serbs:
- under which political-diplomatic circumstances of international relations and historical conditions was Memorandum written?
- which specific territory had to be included into the borders of an autonomous Serbian state under Ottoman suzerainty and Russian protectorate?
- who was to rule over this state?
- how important was the Memorandum to the further development of Serbian political ideology and thought?
To date, the most distinguished examination of the topic of this article was that of protojerej St. M. Dimitrijević in his 1926 book.[iv] However, except for the fact that the book contains the text of the original Memorandum its value to the topic and main problems discussed in this article is limited. In other words, Dimitrijević did not attempt to provide answers to any questions responsive to the topic of this article. Moreover, he did not address the importance of the Memorandum to Serbian secular national ideology since Stratimirović’s plan was seen by Dimitrijević only as a contribution to the development of Serbian church ideology. However, Dimitrijević’s work inspired Serbian historian Đoko M. Slijepčević to write in 1936 the book about Stevan Stratimirović.[v] Nevertheless, it was primarily Stratimirović’s personality as a head of Serbian national church in the Habsburg Monarchy that was described in this work. Slijepčević dealt very little with Stratimirović’s political ideas. Shortly thereafter, Slijepčević wrote a reliable biography of Stratimirović but his intention was not to deal with the Metropolitan’s political thought. Finally, another Serbian historian, Dimitrije Ruvarac, wrote his account on Stratimirović’s work. But, unfortunately it was only a report on Stratimirović’s geographic notes apropos Turkey written in 1803 and 1804.[vi]
International politics and historical circumstances in which the Serbs lived at the turn of the 19th century
At the beginning of the 19th century, after centuries of Ottoman rule, relations between Turks and Serbs remained unchanged. The population of the Beogradski pašaluk was sharply divided into Muslim and Christian. The Muslims, composed of converted domestic Slavs and ethnic Turks, were landlords while all non-Muslims were serfs-peasants (reaya). The Serbs were second class citizens economically, politically and etnically subjugated and religiously and socially discriminated. The Serbs and the Muslims were religiously exclusive and in permanent conflict with each other.[vii] The Orthodox Serbs, unlike the ethnic Turks or the Slavic Muslims, did not accept the Sultan’s policy of Ottomanisation of all citizens of the Ottoman Empire. For the Serbs it was an alien, oppressive and burdensome state because the Ottoman Empire and its social organization were created and functioned according to Islamic religious law.[viii] The mind of the Serbs was preoccupied with the re-creation of the mediaeval national empire which was dismantled by the Turks in the years of 1371−1459.[ix]
The last two decades of the 18th century marked the period of Serbian national revival, the era of the creation of national awareness.[x] Political, economic, and cultural developments of the Austrian Serbs influenced their fellow citizens in the Ottoman Empire. The national political ideology created by the Serbian religious intelligentsia in southern Hungary tremendously influenced the Serbs of the Beogradski pašaluk mainly through the church propaganda.[xi] The role of the Serbian Orthodox church in the creation of cultural and national identity during the time of the Ottoman occupation and its contribution to national liberation was of inestimable importance.[xii] The Serbian Orthodox church however identified the fate of the Serbian people with that of their church and presented itself as the principal saviour of the nation. The Serbian church organization in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire was intimately linked with the Russian Orthodox church. Russian cultural and religious influence among the Austrian and Ottoman Serbs was consequently very high particularly in the matter of the Serbian literal language.[xiii] The Serbian Metropolitanat of Sremski Karlovci represented a key link between the Patriarchate in Moscow and the Serbian Orthodox believers in the Balkans.
The leading and most influential representative of the Metropolitanat of Sremski Karlovci was its Metropolitan Stevan Stratimirović. In the early years of his church career he was a bishop of Buda until the Timisoara’s Council of the Serbian church in the Habsburg Monarchy in 1790. In this council he became not only the Metropolitan of the Serbian church in Austria but the leader of the entire Serbian population inside the Habsburg Monarchy.[xiv] Stratimirović was not interested only in church affairs; Serbian national problems occupied his mind even before the First Serbian Uprising broke up. Thinking about Serbia’s liberation and national unification he wrote a letter addressed to the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II on July 1, 1786. This document contains the Metropolitan’s personal proposal on how to resolve Serbian national problems inside the Ottoman Empire.[xv] To the Emperor Stratimirović proposed that the Austrian army intervene against the Turks and liberate the Serbs inside the Beogradski pašaluk.[xvi]
During the Austro-Turkish War of 1788−1791 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1787−1792 the Serbian patriots and public workers from the Habsburg Monarchy undertook serious diplomatic activities in order to attract the support of foreign powers in the liberation of Serbia.[xvii] In July 1791 Stevan Jovanović, Vasilije Radovanović and Jovan Milović sent а special petition regarding the living conditions of the Serbs in the Beogradski pašaluk to Stevan Stratimirović. The letter was for the Austrian Emperor. They appealed for amnesty for all Serbs who had fought against the Turks on the Austrian side after the end of the war between Austria and Turkey. Amnesty was to be acquired from the Turkish Sultan by the Austrian authorities during the peace negotiations 1791 in the town of Svishtov. The Karlovci Metropolitan handed over this petition to the Habsburg sovereign probably after insertion of his own corrections to the document.[xviii] Stevan Stratimirović actually became a representative of all Serbs either from Austria or Turkey to the Habsburg court. He was very well informed about the Serbs from the Ottoman Empire because he maintained connections with the well-known church’s representatives and national leaders from Serbia. Stratimirović, for instance, had very long talk in Sremski Karlovci with the Serbian émigrés from Turkey connected with the question of Serbian autonomy and the self-government inside the Ottoman Empire. This conversation was held just before the Austro-Turkish war ended in 1791. Stratimirović’s conversation with the Serbians about the “Serbian question” became subsequently the substructure for his Memorandum of 1804.
Several projects connected with the reconstruction of the Serbian state were drafted during the 18th century:
- by the Serbian Patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović-Šakabenta (1736/1737),
- by the Austrian Count Waldemar Schmetau (1774),
- by the Serb from Austria David Narandžić (1785, 1788),
- by one other Austrian Serb Dimitrije Vujić (1797/1798), and
- by the Montenegrin Metropolitan Petar I Petrović-Njegoš (1798).
All of these projects influenced the Karlovci Metropolitan to design his own plan for autonomous Serbia. The idea of the semi-independent an autonomous Serbian Duchy inside the Ottoman Empire however did not occupy only Stratimirović’s mind. The Serbs from Austria like arhimandrit Stevan Jovanović, arhimandrit Arsenije Gagović and nobleman Sava Tekelija were inspired with the same political concept. Tekelija for instance submitted his own Memorandum to the German-Austrian Emperor Francis II in 1805 suggesting that the Austrian army help the Serbs to re-establish their national medieval empire.[xix] In 1802 a Serbian nobleman from Arad, Sava Tekelija, realized that support of some mighty European country was indispensable to Serbian national liberation and the re-making of the Serbian national state. In contrast to Stratimirović, Tekelija saw Austria as a protector of the Serbs and Serbia. The leader of the First Serbian Uprising Đorđe Petrović-Karađorđe (Карагеоргије, i.e., Black George) during the initial months of the rebellion also belonged to the circle of the Serbian national workers who turned their eyes towards the Habsburg Monarchy.[xx] The Serbian russophiles on the other hand were represented by the Herzegovinian arhimandrit Arsenije Gagović. He travelled just before the beginning of the upraising in 1803 to Russia on a diplomatic mission undoubtedly on Stratimirović’s initiative. The purpose of the mission was to engage the Tsar in the issue of the “Serbian question”. Gagović specifically suggested to the Russian monarch that the freeing of the Ottoman Serbs be accomplished with the help of the Russian army.[xxi] Jovan Jovanović, the Serbian bishop from Bačka, as well as arhimandrit Gagović and Metropolitan Stratimirović, belonged to the group of Serbian intellectuals who saw imperial Russia as a natural protector of the Serbs.[xxii] Jovanović’s political ideas were expressed in the letter sent to the Russian Metropolitan of St. Petersburg (on January 14, 1804) in which the bishop of Bačka proposed that the brother of the Russian Tsar, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, be crowned as the Serbian Emperor after Serbia’s liberation from the Ottoman rule.[xxiii]
All of those proposals point to the fact that the unification of the entire Serbian nation, independent of both Austria and Turkey into a single national state was not yet being considered. According to the proposals, liberated Serbia would become a vassal state either within the Habsburg Monarchy or the Ottoman Empire under Austrian or Russian political and military protectorate. The only difference between the Serbian austrophiles and russophiles was on the question of on which empire the Serbs should depend. The first group relied on the Habsburgs since Austria was closer to Serbia then Russia and could intervene more rapidly, militarily.[xxiv] The economic reasons also played a considerable role in their political plans because the Austrian Serbs and the Ottoman Serbs were in close economic relations. For them it was economically much more beneficial if all Serbs were to live inside Austria. In contrast, Serbian russophiles relied on the Romanovs as they were the rulers of the Orthodox faith. For them Serbian Orthodoxy, as a crucial indicator of national determination, could be protected only by support of the Russian Orthodox ruling dynasty. The Catholic Habsburgs were perceived as the “unnatural” allies. The majority of the pro-Austrian Serbs belonged to the social strata of merchants, craftsmen and secular intelligentsia who were focused primarily on the economic benefits of the Austrian protectorate over all Serbs. Their pro-Russian opponents, however, were composed essentially of the Serbian Orthodox clergy either from the Habsburg Monarchy or the Ottoman Empire who tried at first to emancipate the Serbian religious-national identity.[xxv]
The essential role of the Balkans in international politics at the turn of the 19th century was as the focus of the Austrian and Russian competition and struggle for control over the region. After the liberation of Hungary in 1686/1699, and in the course of driving back the Turks towards the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea, the Habsburg Monarchy secured supremacy in the north-western Balkans. After freeing some Balkan territories from the Ottoman control, Austria organized the defense of the frontier areas against Turkey. They introduced a special system which turned out to be a keystone of its political and military strategy in Southeastern Europe. This Austrian defensive military frontier zone (“Militärgrenze”) was originally organized in 1576 as a bulwark against the Ottoman assaults but also as a bridgehead for its own attacks on Turkish territories (in Bosnia and Serbia). This military zone was settled by large number of Serbian emigrants from Turkey who became professional soldiers, i.e., the frontiersmen.[xxvi] One of the turning points of the Austro-Turkish War from 1788 to 1791 was the establishment of a Serbian free fighting corps and the emergence of a Serbian political leadership that formulated Serbia’s national goals more energetically than had been the case previously.[xxvii]
The Russo-Turkish War 1768−1774 ended with the peace of Kuchuk-Kainarji in 1774. It gave Russia Azov and secured Russian political influence in tributary Principalities of Moldavia and Walachia. However, the Ottoman authorities gave Austria the northern part of Moldavia, which was named Bukovina, in 1775 in return for the diplomatic support of Austria gave in the settling of problems with Russia. According to the Treaty of Jassy signed in January 1792, Russia received from Turkey the former Crimean Khanate. The Russo-Turkish border was established on the Dniester River. The Serbs within the Beogradski pašaluk received political autonomy which became the foundation for Stratimirović’s plan of Serbia’s political semi-independence in the Ottoman Empire. With the Peace of Jassy, the Russo-Austrian rivalry over the Balkans was resolved in favour of Russia.[xxviii] In addition, Russia’s gradual forcing of the Ottoman Empire out of the Crimea and Moldavia in the 18th century resulted in limitation on the Polish-Lithuanian (i.e., the Roman-Catholic) sphere of influence in the region of southeast Ukraine and the north Black Sea littoral and in strengthening of Russian (i.e., the Orthodox) influence and prestige in the same area.
With Russia’s drawing nearer to the Danube and to Constantinople the popularity of imperial Russia gradually grew among the Serbs. The 18th –century Russian-Ottoman conflict reinforced among the Serbs the idea of Romanov Russia as the principal bulwark of Orthodox Christendom. It can be concluded that in the year of Stratimirović’s Memorandum Russian influence had already pushed back that of Austria among the Balkan Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. This Russian approach towards Serbian lands directly influenced Stratimirović to write his document in which he supported the idea of the Russian protectorate over the Balkan Orthodox population drafted in the “Greek Project” by the Russian Empress Catherine II (the “Great”). In 1782 the Empress proposed to the Austrian Emperor Joseph II that Bessarabia, Moldavia and Walachia be united into the independent state of “Dacia” under the Russian protectorate. In addition, the Greek (i.e., Byzantine) Empire with Constantinople as a capital was to be re-established on the eastern portion of the Balkans and placed under the Russian patronage. Consequently, the real aim of Stratimirović’s Memorandum was to convince the Russian Tsar to extend Russian patronage over an autonomous Serbia as well. Similarly, he believed that the recent example of the establishment of the Russian protectorate over the autonomous territory of the Ottoman Christian Orthodox subjects of the Ionian Islands (Leucas, Cephalonia, Ithaca, Zante, Cythera) in 1799 could be replicated in the case of the Serbs and Serbia as well.
Diplomatic activities of Metropolitan Stratimirović
The role of Metropolitan Stratimirović in the First Serbian Uprising has not yet been effectively explained in Serbian historiography. Stratimirović was surely very well informed in regard to the political situation in Serbia and political wishes of the Serbs within the Ottoman Empire. Prota Mateja Nenadović, one of the most outstanding leaders of the Uprising and military commander of western Serbia, submitted to Stratimirović the first written statement on the political concerns and goals of Serbia’s military leadership. The proposal was drafted by the most eminent leaders of the Uprising at the end of February 1804. Stratimirović’s answer with personal comments on the statement reached Prota Mateja Nenadović on March 29th of the same year. Nenadović delivered Stratimirović’s answer directly to the leader of the Uprising, Đorđe Petrović-Karađorđe.[xxix] This prompts two conclusions:
- it clearly confirms that the Karlovci Metropolitan established and maintained uninterrupted political relations with the supreme military headquarters of the Serbian insurgents already at the very beginning of the Uprising, and
- it documents that he was very well informed on the political wishes, plans and ideology of Serbia’s supreme military authority.
Stratimirović, inspired and reinforced by the first written statement about the political wishes of Serbia’s military leadership, started to work to obtain political and military support for Serbian insurgents by the Habsburg’s court. In the same year he wrote three letters to the Austrian Archduke Carl, on May 31st, June 29th and August 16th.[xxx] In these letters Stratimirović presented himself as the principal political ambassador of the Serbs from both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire to the imperial court in Vienna. He strongly believed that a peace in rebellious Serbia would be re-established only if Serbia’s military authorities’ political demands were accepted by the Ottoman government. Stratimirović at the same time advocated the idea of establishing tolerable Turkish system of government in Serbia which would replace the anarchy and violence of the local Turkish authorities. Finally, at this point the Karlovci Metropolitan saw the house of Habsburgs as a key guarantor of peace in Serbia. In the other words, Serbia needed to be put under the Habsburg’s protectorate.
Stratimirović, the head of Serbian church in the Habsburg Monarchy, however, simultaneously sugested to Serbia’s military leaders they send a political deputation to the Russian imperial court to convey their political wishes and requirements. His ultimate aim in fact was to convince the Russian Emperor to become the real protector of the Ottoman and Austrian Serbs and the peace-keeper in a united Serbia. Consequently, Stratimirović established the road to St. Petersburg for the first Serbian deputation sent to the Russian Emperor during the Uprising. The deputation, joined by Prota Mateja Nenadović, Petar Novaković Čardaklija and Jovan Protić, departed for Russia on September 13th, 1804. They submitted on November 15th, 1804 to the Russian Emperor Alexander I the Serbian petition “for safekeeping and salvation” asking him to take Serbia under the Russian protectorate.[xxxi] The petition was certainly based on Stratimirović’s political ideas cointained in his Memorandum. It turned out that the Serbian deputation in St. Petersburg reiterated exactly what Stratimirović had proposed in his Memorandum: the re-establishment of a Serbian state (Сербское правление) and official expression of Serbia’s loyalty to the Turkish Sultan. The Russian imperial court accepted Stratimirović’s idea of an autonomous Serbian state within the Ottoman Empire but under Russian political-military protectorate, similar to the status of the Danube principalities of Moldavia and Walachia in the Ottoman Empire.[xxxii]
Stratimirović had already formed his idea of Serbian liberation from Austrian and Ottoman control before the beginning of the First Serbian Uprising. His political ideas about Serbian and all South-Slavic liberation and the re-establishment of Serbian and South-Slavic mediaeval statehood were expressed by Stratimirović’s deputy, arhimandrit Arsenije Gagović, to the Russian Emperor in St. Petersburg on November 2nd, 1803. Gagović, following the instructions of the Karlovci Metropolitan, proposed to Alexander I that Russia support the liberation and political unification of South-Slavic peoples into the Slavonic-Serbian Empire. Gagović also recommended that one Russian Grand Duke be appointed by the Russian monarch as Emperor of this Empire.[xxxiii]
Тhe crucial question with respect to the diplomatic activities of the Karlovci Metropolitan that arises is: why did Stratimirović look upon Russia as the only ingenuous liberator and political-military protector of the Serbs and, moreover, the rest of the South-Slavs? Stratimirović obviously thought that Russia was the only European country with genuine affinity towards the South-Slavs especially the Serbs. The main fosterer of such an opinion among the Serbs was the Serbian Orthodox clergy headed by Stratimirović. Imperial Russia as an Orthodox country and the country with the largest Slavic population gradually inspired the spiritual-political leader of the Serbian nation during the Habsburg and Ottoman lordships, (i.e. the Serbian Orthodox church, since the end of 17th century) to believe that only the Romanovs could be real liberators and protectors of the Serbs and the rest of the South-Slavs, especially the Orthodox ones.[xxxiv] The Serbian Orthodox clergy welcomed the Romanovs’ Panslavism - the official course of the Russian foreign policy in Europe.
The Serbian Orthodox Church moved more closely towards Russia during the 18th century when, as a consequence of the Habsburgs’ military victories over the Turks, Roman-Catholic influence in the Balkans significantly increased.[xxxv] The Serbian priests, in order to prevent Roman-Catholic dominance in the region, urged Russia to put all South-Slavic populations under its political protection. As a consequence of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s propaganda in favor of the Russians, the reputation of the Russian Emperor in Serbian eyes significantly increased at the end of the 18th century. Subsequently, Sava Tekelija, a Serbian nobleman from Arad, advised that in the case of the new Russo-Ottoman war the Serbs, as well the Bulgarians, would welcome Russia as their liberator.[xxxvi] In return, the Serbian clergy always reminded the Serbs of the connections which linked them to the Russians: “divine, natural and eternal bonds of the blood, language and faith” (“Божанска, природна и вечна веза крви, језика и вере“).[xxxvii] The historicalal role of shared Orthodoxy and language were especially emphasised in this pro-Russian propaganda. Clearly, Orthodoxy became for the majority of ethnolinguistic Serbs a main symbol of the national struggle against the Ottoman authorities. At the turn of the 19th century the myth of Orthodoxy became the foremost instrument in the hands of the Serbian clergy in their combat against Austrian (i.e., Roman-Catholic) political supremacy in the Balkans. They at the same time supported the Russian concept of united Orthodox nations as the crucial step towards realization of the Russian policy of Panslavism. The Serbian spiritual leaders came to view Orthodox-Slavic Russia as the only sincere liberator and protector of both the Southeast European Orthodox population (Romanians, Serbs, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Bulgarians and Greeks) and the South-Slavs (Yugoslavs and Bulgarians).[xxxviii]
Finally, for the Orthodox Serbs and Russians anything that was bad for the Turks and the Ottoman Empire was good for them. Many Serbs unequivocally welcomed Russian military victory over the Turks in 1774, especially the article of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji which established a Russian protectorate over Moldavia and Walachia with the Russian right of guardianship of all Balkan Orthodox populations in the Ottoman Empire. Stratimirović, unconditionally culturally and politically oriented toward Russia, saw in this article of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji a very timely and appropriate legal opportunity for extension of a Russian protection over both Austrian and Ottoman Serbs.
Stratimirović’s concept of the religion-language based Slavonic-Serbian state under the Russian protectorate
Stratimirovic’s Memorandum represents one of the earliest political programs of Serbian liberation and unification in modern Serbian history of political thought. He recognized that the Ottoman Serbs were not able to free themselves fighting alone against the Turks. In this respect, they needed to rely on one powerful European country which would give military and diplomatic support to the Serbian rebels. Consequently, the issue of a Serbian uprising had to be included in the broader context of European policy of Great Powers and international relations.[xxxix] He was deeply and sincerely convinced that the Orthodox Russian Empire was a natural Serbian ally. As a result, the Russian Empire needed to become Serbia’s patron in her struggle for freedom and national unification. With this in mind, the Karlovci Metropolitan sent his Memorandum to Tsar Alexander I. The vision of a unified Serbia under the Russian patronage but inside the Ottoman Empire animated Stratimirović’s plan. In the other words, he favoured creation of an autonomous Serbia under Ottoman suzerainty but governed by the Russian Grand Duke or Viceroy. Stratimirović’s Memorandum, or the so-called the “Plan for Serbian liberation”, was submitted in June 1804 to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Duke Adam Czartoryski, by Serbian arhimandrit Arsenije Gagovic who was the Orthodox chaplain in the Russian embassy in Vienna.[xl]
The actual political situation in Europe was elaborated in the first part of the Memorandum. Stratimirović concluded that only Russia was a real independent and powerful Orthodox country in the world. However, according to him, the European peoples viewed Russia as an Asiatic country as, for instance, in the case of the Poles, even though the Russians were the members of the Slavic community. The Karlovci Metropolitan explained the negative attitude of the Poles towards Orthodoxy and Russia as the product of propaganda activities of the Jesuit Order of the Roman-Catholic church in Poland whose main goal was to fight Orthodoxy throughout Europe.
In the second part of his plan Stratimirović considered the question of the liberation of the Balkans from the Ottoman rule. Here, he rejected the Plan for the re-establishing of the Greek Empire, i.e. the plan for liberation of the Balkan Orthodox population drafted by the Russian Empress Catherine II in 1782. According to this plan, all Balkan Orthodox peoples would be included in the new Byzantine Empire with the its capital in Constantinople. They would be governed by one Russian Duke, designated as their Emperor.[xli] But, Stratimirovic was of the opinion that Russian influence in this Empire would be decreased bacause of the anti-Russian activities of the Greeks who had never been sincere admirers of Russia. The Karlovci Metropolitan concluded that the Russian alliance with the Greeks would be catastrophic from the onset.[xlii] Stratimirović suggested to the Russian authorities that only the Serbs in the Balkans were bona fide allies of the Russian Empire. For that reason, according to Stratimirović, Russia would have more benefits from the re-establishment of the Serbian state in the Balkans rather than a Greek state. In conclusion, in order to attract the Russian Emperor for his plan, Stratimirović launched the idea that the establishment of a Serbian state in the Balkans under Russian patronage was to be the primary precondition for the realization of the Russian goal of gaining control over the Black Sea littoral and Thrace since a Serbian state would serve as a natural barrier against Austrian penetration into the Russian political sphere of interest.
The third part of the Memorandum dealt with the problem of the internal disolution of the Ottoman Empire. The Karlovci Metropolitan noted that Ottoman European possessions were already in the process of total and incurable disintegration and destruction, as for example every Turkish provincial governor, the Pasha, had became independent of the central government which was unable to prevent the Empire from its internal political break up and regional separation. As a consequence of this situation, the beginning of the 19th century offered the best opportunities to create a semi-independent Serbian state in the Balkans but which was possible only with Russian diplomatic support of the Serbs.
In the fourth part of his plan Stratimirović proposed the creation of a Serbian tributary state in the Balkans under the Sultan’s nominal suzerainty. State-political relationships between the newly established Serbian state and the Ottoman Empire would be similar to the state-political relations between the Republic of Dubrovnik and the Republic of the Ionian Islands with the Ottoman Empire. Like the Republic of the Ionian Islands, a semi-independent Serbia would be put under the Russian political-military protectorate. Finally, after the creation of the Serbian tributary state, the Turkish Sultan would get some territorial compensations in Asia from the Russian Emperor.
The concept of a revived Serbian national state drafted in the Memorandum was essentially based on the idea that both the Serbs from the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy would join it. Subsequently, the following territories of the Habsburg Monarchy populated by the Serbs would be incorporated into the tributary autonomous national state of the Serbs which Stratimirović designated as Slavonic – Serbian (Славено-Сербско государство) encompassing:
- the Gulf of Boka Kotorska with the city of Kotor,
- the parts of Dalmatia and Croatia eastward from the Una River, the Krka River and the city of Šibenik,
- the territory between the Danube River, the Sava River and the Vuka River, and
- the main portion of Slavonia.[xliii]
The lands that were historically and ethnically Serbian under the Ottoman Empire were to be consolidated into liberated Serbia also. It would be composed of:
- the Beogradski pašaluk (from the Sava River and the Danube River to the Western Morava River, and from the Drina River to the Timok River),
- Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- Kosovo and Metohija (with the cities of Peć, Đakovica, Banja, Priština, Prizren, Vučitrn, Mitrovica and Zvečan), and
- north-western Bulgaria with the city of Vidin and its hinterland and the Lom River.
However, in addition, Stratimirović in his works also identified other territories which, by virtue of ethnicity, would subsequently be components of the area of a Serbian nation:
- part of the western Walachia between the Danube River and the Jiu River,
- present-day southern Serbia with the cities of Niš, Leskovac, Kruševac, Vranje and Bujanovac, and
- the present-day northern Albania with the city of Scutari.[xliv]
In dealing with the problem of fixing the borders of the Slavonic–Serbian state the Karlovci Metropolitan applied both historical and ethnic principles:
- firstly, according to the historical principle, the territory of mediaeval Serbia would compose Stratimirović’s Slavonic–Serbian state, and
- secondly, in accordance with the ethnic principle, all Balkan territories settled by the Orthodox South Slavic population who spoke Shtokavian (штокавски)[xlv] dialect were considered to belong to the Serbian ethnic space and saw as the part of the Slavonic–Serbian state.
With respect to the determination of the ethnic space of the Serbs Stratimirović was strongly influenced by the theory of the concept of ethnic-linguistic space of Serbdom developed at the time by Sava Tekelija. His ethnic-linguistic concept of Serbdom was presented in his short essay Oписаније живота (Description of life). He posited that all South Slavic population who spoke the Shtokavian, Kajkavian and Chakavian dialects, regardless of religion, belonged to the Serbian nation. Tekelija designated the folloving territories as ethnic-linguistic Serbian ones: Serbia proper, Kosovo and Metohija, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Macedonia, Republic of Dubrovnik, Carniola (Kranjska), Styria (Štajerska), Carinthia (Koruška), Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, southern Hungary (present-day Vojvodina) and the northern Albania. He suggested that all of these “Serbian” territories should compose one single Serbian national state which would have borders on the Adriatic and the Black Sea. In his view, this state would be mainly populated by Orthodox Serbs and by a minority of Roman-Catholics. Tekelija called these territories as Illyricum. The name reflects a wide spread theory of the time that all South Slavs originated from the ancient Balkan Illyrians who in Tekelija’s eyes were the ethnic-language-based Serbs, i.e., the speakers of Kajkavian, Shtokavian and Chakavian dialects.[xlvi]
Nevertheless, Stratimirović did not accept as a whole Tekelija’s concept of the Kajkavian-Shtokavian-Chakavian language-based Serbian nation. The Karlovci Metropolitan thought that only the Orthodox Christian population of the South Slavs who spoke only the Shtokavian dialect belonged to the genuine ethnic-language-based Serbdom. As a result, the Slovenes (the Roman-Catholic and Kajkavian speaking population from Carinthia, Carniola and Styria), the Bulgarians (Bulgarian speaking population from the eastern Balkans) and the Croats (the Roman-Catholic and Kajkavian and Chakavian speaking population from Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia) were excluded from the community of Srtatimirović’s religion-language-based Serbian nation and subsequently from his Slavonic–Serbian state.[xlvii]
As territorial compensation from the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Monarchy was to receive the following:
- the western part of the so-called “Turkish Croatia”, i.e., the lands between the Una River and Petrova Gora, and
- the lands between Transilvania, the Danube River and the Olta River.[xlviii]
In the other words, for ceding Srem and southern Dalmatia to the Serbian tributary state which would be de iure within the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Monarchy would obtain from Turkey north-western Bosnia and the south westernmost part of Walachia. According to Stratimirović, the territories which would be ceded to the Habsburg Monarchy by the Ottoman Empire were triple the area of the territories which the Habsburg Monarchy would cede to unified Serbian national state. For the Karlovci Metropolitan, inclusion of the territory of Srem into united Serbia was of importance to the Serbs since 80% of its population consisted of the “Greco-Orthodox believers”, i.e. the Serbs, and 20% the “Roman-Catholics”, i.e. present-day the Croats, and also because the seat of the Serbian church was in Srem in the city of Sremski Karlovci.
In drafting his plan of the Serbian state, Stratimirović took into consideration possible negative international reactions to the re-creation of a national state of the Serbs. He knew very well that there were in contemporary Europe several states, such France, Great Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy, whose anticipated Balkan policy was one of thwarting the Ottoman Empire’s disintegration. For instance, Austrian Minister-Premier Kaunitz openly announced that the survival of the Ottoman Empire was absolutely consistent with Austrian foreign policy in Southeastern Europe[xlix] Knowing that, and in order to keep the contemporary European balance of power and European diplomatic house of cards unchanged, Stratimirović envisaged a liberated and unified Serbia as the part of the Ottoman Empire.
According to the author of the Memorandum, taking into account the lower level of general education of the Ottoman Serbs, the national state of the Serbs had to have a monarchical and not a republican constitution. In the other words, he thought that the Serbs were not yet sufficiently mature to operate under a republican constitution. Stratimirović knew that at that time the Serbs had neither the representatives of a national dynasty or a political aristocracy. In contemplating a future head of a Serbian monarchical state he concluded that the best solution was the elevation of one of the Russian Grand Dukes to such a position. In the other words, Serbia’s ruler had to be a member of the Russian imperial dynasty of the Romanovs primarily since the Russian imperial dynasty was of the same Christian-Orthodox religion as the Serbs. The Russian Grand Duke then would be appointed directly by the Tsar Alexander I Romanov as Serbia’s ruler. This Grand Duke would come to Serbia with a Russian military contingent of 4000 soldiers. They would be the principal guarantee of Serbian liberty. Subsequently, a unified Serbian national state would become the tributary, autonomous, semi-independent, Orthodox Grand Duchy under Russian patronage and only formally recognize the Sultan’s suzerainty. The Moslem population within the religion-language-based Serbian Grand Duchy would have the right of free expression of their faith.
Further, in the event that the Russian Emperor declined to nominate one of the Russian imperial Grand Dukes to be the sovereign of Serbia, according to the Memorandum, the Serbian ruler would then be chosen from the German Protestant Dukes, instead of the Russian pretender to the Serbian throne. Evidently, Stratimirović’s firm requirement with respect to Serbia’s monarch was that the person who governed Serbia could not be of the Roman-Catholic religion! Stratimirović presumed that a Roman-Catholic Duke would not want to convert to the Orthodox faith in order to assume the Serbian throne. In this respect, the author of the Memorandum believed that a Protestant Duke would be more likely to become the member of the Orthodox church than a Roman-Catholic. Nevertheless, Stratimirović sincerely believed that there would be interested noblemen of the Russian imperial court who would like to be appointed by the Russian Emperor as Serbia’s monarch. His belief was based on the case of Russian Count Waldemar Schmetau who in 1774 had put himself forth as such a candidate and even tried to prove that he was an actual descendent of the Serbian mediaeval Duke Lazar Hrebeljanović (killed during the Kosovo Battle on June 28th, 1389).[l]
In his Memorandum the proposed Serbian national state which was to be established with Russian support and function under the Russian protectorate the Karlovci Metropolitan called it the СЛАВЕНО−СЕРБСКО ГОСУДАРСТВО. This Slavonic–Serbian state was to be a monarchical one, autonomous and Orthodox with the Grand Duke as the head of it. Consequently, his proposed national state of the Serbs was an autonomous Orthodox Slavonic–Serbian Grand Duchy under the Russian protectorate within the Ottoman Empire. In conclusion, Stratimirović’s religion-language-based Славено–Сербско государство would include the entire South Slavic population whose mother tongue was Shtokavian dialect and the national religion, Christian Orthodoxy.
When the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Duke Adam Czartoryski (who was a Roman-Catholic Pole), read Stratimirović’s plan on the creation of a Slavonic–Serbian Grand Duchy he rejected the main idea. Instead of Stratimirović’s proposal, Czartoryski favoured the earlier plan which called for the creation of the Greek Empire on the Balkans whose main ideological protagonist was the Russian Empress Catherine II. In fact, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs had a plan to cede to the Habsburg Monarchy Croatia, Slavonia, Dubrovnik, Belgrade and parts of Walachia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.[li] However, Catherine II with respect to the earlier plan on the division of the Ottoman territories between the Russian Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy did not support the principle of national determination of the Balkan peoples as, for example, the Serbs would be split between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Greek Empire. In this respect, Stratimirović’s Memorandum had the aim of pursuading the Russian authorities to finally reject the idea of the creation of the Greek Empire and to accept his idea of the establishment of a united Serbian state. From the Empress’ plan the Karlovci Metropolitan only accepted the idea of Russian political-military protectorate over the Balkan Christian Orthodox nations.
Finally, Stratimirović’s idea about creation of the autonomous religion-language-based Orthodox Shtokavian Slavonic–Serbian Grand Duchy under the Russian protectorate and only de iure within the Ottoman Empire significantly influenced Serbian political thought in the very near future:
- The Stratimirović’s central idea in the Memorandum was accepted by the official deputation which was sent by the Serbian rebels from the Beogradski pašaluk to the Turkish Sultan in Istanbul on July 13th, 1806 to negotiate the peace agreement with the Ottoman authorities. The Ottoman government also accepted the main proposals in the Memorandum in response to these Serbian requirements on August 15th, 1806. However, at that time the peace agreeement between the Serbian insurgents and the Ottoman Empire was not signed primarily because the Russian diplomats did not support the main idea contained in the Memorandum since they held a different concept of the political arrangement of the Balkans than that of Stratimirović.[lii]
- Another Serbian deputation from the Beogradski pašaluk went to Istanbul in January 1813 to negotiate the peace treaty with requirements which were also based on Stratimirović’s idea of the creation of autonomous Serbian state within the Ottoman Empire. The Serbian requirements of 1813 were based fundamentally on Stratimirović’s idea of the Russian protectorate over autonomous Serbia. This idea was already incorporated into the Article № Eight of the Russian-Ottoman Peace Treaty of Bucharest, signed on May 28th, 1812.[liii]
- Stratimirović’s concept of the determination of the Serbian nation according to the Shtokavian dialect was accepted by the leading Serbian ideologue of the “language-based Serbian nation” model – Vuk Stefanović Karadžić in his ideological article “Serbs Аll and Еverywhere” (“Срби сви и свуда“), written in 1836 and published in 1849. However, in contrast to the Karlovci Metropolitan’s idea that only South Slavic Orthodox Shtokavian speaking population belonged to the Serbdom, Karadžić was convinced that the entire South Slavic population who spoke the Shtokavian dialect, regardless of their Roman-Catholic, Muslim or Orthodox religious affiliations, composed the genuine ethnic Serbian nation.[liv]
- Stratimirović’s notion of a politically united Serbian nation created from the territories of both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire within the single borders of a national state inspired the pivotal Serbian 19th-century politician Ilija Garašanin who in 1844 launched the idea of a politically united “language-based Serbian nation” of the Shtokavian dialect in his political-ideological work Načertanije (Начертаније-Draft).[lv]
The Karlovci Metropolitan Stevan Stratimirović created the idea of autonomous tributary religion-language-based Orthodox Shtokavian Slavonic–Serbian state in 1804. The state was to be governed by the Russian Grand Duke, under the Russian political-military protectorate, as well as to be only nominally included into the Ottoman Empire and to pay an annual fixed tribute to the Turkish Sultan as its suzerain. Stratimirović’s concept of a politically united religion-language-based Serbian nation within the borders of a single national state anticipated unification of the historical and ethnic Serbian territories from both the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. His notion of national identification of the Serbs was innovative at that time. In other words, he created the idea of a Serbian nation combining the criteria of language and religious principle. As a result, according to Stratimirović, the Serbian nation was idintified as the entire Christian Orthodox South Slavic population who spoke the Shtokavian (штокавски) dialect. Subsequently, all Balkan territories settled by the Orthodox-Shtokavian South Slavs had to be included into a unified Serbian national state. Stratimirović’s ideas were expressed in the Memorandum submitted to the Russian Emperor Alexander I Romanov. Produced at a pivotal time, the Memorandum was one of the major contributions to the history of Serbian modern political doctrines and ideologies. One one of the most important national state projects, it was created at a critical time during the turning point in Serbian history: at the time of the First Serbian Uprising (1804−1813).
There were many plans during the uprising connected with the question of Serbian liberation and national political unification. The Memorandum was one of the most important of them.
[i] About the uprising see in M. B. Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia 1804−1918, I, (New York, London, 1976); W. S. Vucinich, The First Serbian Uprising 1804–1813 (New York, 1982); V. H. W. Temperley, History of Serbia (New York, 1969); М. Ђорђевић, Политичка историја Србије, I, 1804−1813 (Београд, 1956).
[ii] Pašaluk is Serbian version of the biggest Ottoman administrative province – pashalik. The governor of pashalik had the title of Pasha (in Serbian, Paša).
[iii] For a discussion of the Beogradski pašaluk see: Д. Пантелић, Београдски пашалук пред први српски устанак (1794−1804) (Београд, 1949).
[iv] Ст. Т. Димитријевић, Стевана Стратимировића, Митрополита Карловачког План за ослобођење српског народа (Београд, 1926).
[v] Ђ. М. Слијепчевић, Стеван Стратимировић, Митрополит Карловачки као поглавар цркве, просветни и национално-политички радник (Београд, 1936).
[vi] Д. Руварац, Гeoграфске белешке о Турској Митрополита Стевана Стратимировића из године 1803 и 1804 (Београд, 1903).
[vii] Х. Шабановић (ed.), Турски извори о српској револуцији 1804 (Београд, 1956), 200−204 .
[viii] B. Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Ninetheenth Centuries (Cambridge, 1984), 43−44. More about the relations between Islamic religious law and Ottoman state’s system see in: H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300−1600 ( New York, 1973); N. Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (New York, 1972).
[ix] В. Чубриловић, Историја политичке мисли у Србији у XIX веку (Београд, 1982); Р. Љушић, Вожд Карађорђе, I (Смедеревска Паланка, 1993), 133−145; А. Ивић (уредник), Списи Бечких архива о првом српском устанку, I, 1804 (Београд, 1935); С. Стратимировић, “Објашњење постанка и узроци устанка српских хришћана 1804”, Српски књижевни гласник, 18 (Београд, 1907).
[x] М. Екмечић, Дуго кретање између клања и орања. Историја Срба у Новом веку (1492−1992) (Нови Сад: Евро Ђунти, 2010), 127−150.
[xi] Т. Judah, The Serbs. History, Myth & Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven and London, 1997), 48−72.
[xii] S. Ćirković, “Religious factor in Forming of Cultural and National Identity” in D. Janjić (ed.), Religion & War (Belgrade, 1994), 146−160.
[xiii] A. Albin, “The Creation of the Slaveno-Serbski Literary Language”, The Slavonic and East European Review, XLVIII (113), 483−492.
[xiv] М. Јовић, К. Радић, Српске земље и владари (Крушевац, 1990), 142−146; В. Ћоровић, Историја Срба (Београд, 1993), 510, 514, 528−537.
[xv] Ђ. М. Слијепчевић, Стеван Стратимировић митрополит Карловачки као поглавар цркве, просветни и национално-политички радник (Београд, 1936), 172.
[xvi] Летопис Матице Српске, књига 143 (Нови Сад, 1885), 111−112.
[xvii] Д. Павловић, Србија за време последњег аустријско-турског рата (1788−1791) (Београд, 1910).
[xviii] Д. Павловић, Србија за време последњег аустријско-турског рата (1788−1791) (Београд, 1910), 264−265.
[xix] Д. Поповић, “Сава Текелија према првом српском устанку”, Проблеми Војводине (Нови Сад, 1965), 101.
[xx] Е. Г. Маретић, Историја српске револуције 1804−1813 ( Београд, 1987), 96−109 (Original in German language written immediately after the uprising according to the author’s diary); А. Ивић (уредник), Списи Бечких архива о првом српском устанку, I, 1804 (Београд, 1935); Р. Перовић (уредник), Прилози за историју првог српског устанка. Необјављена грађа (Београд, 1954).
[xxi] Ст. Т. Димитријевић, Стевана Стратимировића, Митрополита Карловачког План за ослобођење српског народа (Београд, 1926), 4.
[xxii] М. Екмечић, Дуго кретање између клања и орања. Историја Срба у Новом веку (1492−1992) (Нови Сад: Евро Ђунти, 2010), 149.
[xxiii] М. Вукићевић, Карађорђе, I (Београд, 1907), 234−239.
[xxiv] И. Пржић, Спољашња политика Србије (1804−1914), (Београд: Политика А. Д., 1939), 14−15.
[xxv] About this problem see more in: E. Picot, Les Serbes de Hongrie (Paris, 1873); Г. Јакшић, Борба за слободу Србије од 1788 до 1813 (Београд, 1991/1937).
[xxvi] About the Austrian “Military Border” see more in: R. Günther, The Military Border in Croatia 1740−1881 (Chicago, 1966).
[xxvii] About this question see more in: J. Bérengar, A History of the Habsburg Empire: 1700−1918 (London, 2000); Д. Павловић, Србија за време последњег аустријско-турског рата (1788−1791) (Београд, 1910).
[xxviii] В. Поповић, Источно питање (Београд, 1928).
[xxix] About Karađorđe’s role in the First Serbian Uprising against the Ottoman authorities see: К. Ненадовић, Живот и дела великог Ђорђа Петровића Кара-ђорђа. Врховног Вожда, ослободиоца и Владара Србије и живот његови Војвода и јунака. Као градиво за Србску Историју од године 1804 до 1813 и на даље (књига Прва, Беч, 1883; књига Друга, Беч, 1884).
[xxx] Ђ. М. Слијепчевић, Стеван Стратимировић, Митрополит Карловачки као поглавар цркве, просветни и национално-политички радник (Београд, 1936), 189.
[xxxi] С. И. Достян, “Планы основания славяно-сербского государства с помощъю России в начале XX в.”, Советское славяховедение, 5 (Москва, 1970), 1005−1007; Первое сербское востание и Россiя, 1 (Москва, 1980), 58−62; П. В. Грачев, Балканские владения Османской империи на рубеже XVIII−XIX вв. (Москва, 1990), 120−138. See more about the deputation in: Мемоари Проте Матије Ненадовића (Београд, 1867); Р. Љушић, Вук Караџић о Српској револуцији (Београд, 1990).
[xxxii] М. Вукићевић, Карађорђе, II (Београд, 1907), 180−199.
[xxxiii] М. Екмечић, Дуго кретање између клања и орања. Историја Срба у Новом веку (1492−1992) (Нови Сад: Евро Ђунти, 2010), 149; Ђ. М. Слијепчевић, Стеван Стратимировић, Митрополит Карловачки као поглавар цркве, просветни и национално-политички радник (Београд, 1936), 176−179.
[xxxiv] More about this question see in: Б. Ђурђев, “Улога српске цркве у борби против османске власти“, Преглед, 1 (Сарајево, 1953).
[xxxv] Г. Витковић, “Извештај Максима Ратковића, егзарха београдског митрополита, 1733”, Гласник, LVI (Београд), 121.
[xxxvi] С. Текелија, Описаније живота (Београд, 1966), 176.
[xxxvii] Р. Љушић, Вожд Карађорђе, I (Смедеревска Паланка, 1993), 119.
[xxxviii] About Panslavism in the Russian foreign policy see in: Ф. А. Миллер, Мустафа-паша Байрактар (Москва, 1947), 58−65.
[xxxix] About the problem of the policy by the European Great Powers towards the “Serbian Question” from 1804 to 1914 see in: В. Поповић, Европа и српско питање (Београд, 1940).
[xl] About the history of submission of the Memorandum to the Russian officials see: Ст. Т. Димитријевић, Стевана Стратимировића, Митрополита Карловачког План за ослобођење српског народа (Београд, 1926), 12−16.
[xli] E. Driault, La politique orientale de Napoléon (Paris, 1904), 30−31.
[xlii] Ђ. М. Слијепчевић, Стеван Стратимировић, Митрополит Карловачки као поглавар цркве, просветни и национално-политички радник (Београд, 1936), 180.
[xliii] The text of Memorandum in: Ст. Т. Димитријевић, Стевана Стратимировића, Митрополита Карловачког План за ослобођење српског народа (Београд, 1926), 17−24.
[xliv] Д. Руварац, Гeoграфске белешке о Турској Митрополита Стевана Стратимировића из године 1803 и 1804 (Београд, 1903).
[xlv] The former “Serbo-Croatian” language is spoken in three dialects: the Kajkavian, Shtokavian, and Chakavian. The majority of present-day Croats speak the Shtokavian dialect. All Serbs were and are speaking only the Shtokavian. The Kajkavian dialect has a Croatian and Slovenian version. The Chakavian was and is spoken only by Croats.
[xlvi] About the claims that ancient Balkan Illyrians were only the ethnic Serbs see: Ј. Бајић, Блажени Јероним, Солинска црква и Србо-Далмати (Шабац: Бели анђео, 2003); Б. Земљанички, Староседеоци Срби и Римљани (Београд: Стручна књига, 1999); Ј. И. Деретић, Д. П. Антић, С. М. Јарчевић, Измишљено досељавање Срба (Београд: Сардонија, 2009).
[xlvii] About the 19th century ideas of ethnic/national identification of the South Slavs according to the dialects of the South Slavic languages see in: Д. Обрадовић, “Писмо Харалампију”, Живот и прикљученија (Нови Сад, 1783/1975), 147; Д. Обрадовић, “Јест ли полезно у простом дијалекту на штампу што издавати”, Изабрани списи (Нови Сад, 1969), 363−364; P. J. Šafařik, Geschichte der slawischen Sprache und Literatur (Buda, 1926); P. J. Šafařik, Slowansky národopis (Prague, 1842/1955), 146−147; В. С. Караџић, “Срби сви и свуда“, Ковчежић за историју и обичаје Срба сва три закона (Беч, 1849), 1−27; J. Kopitar, “Patriotske fantazije jednog Slovena”, Vaterländische Bläter (1810); J. Kopitar, Serbica (Beograd, 1984); J. Dobrovský, Geschichte der böhmische Sprache und Literatur (Wien, 1792/1818); J. Kollár, “О књижевној заимности међу народи и наречјима словенским”, Сербски народни лист (1835); F. Miklošič, “Serbisch und chorvatisch”, Vergleichende Gramatik der slawischen Sprachen (Wien, 1852/1879); Д. Теодоровић, О књижевној узајамности између различни племена и неречија славјанског народа од Јована Колара (Београд, 1845); П. Милосављевић, Срби и њихов језик. Хрестоматија (Приштина, 1997); A. Starčević, Politički spisi (Zagreb, 1971); I. Derkos, Genius patriae super dormientibus sius filiis (Zagreb, 1832); J. Drašković, Disertatia iliti razgovor, darovan gospodi poklisarom zakonskim i budućem zakonotvorcem kraljevinah naših (Karlovac, 1932); V. B. Sotirović, Srpski komonvelt (Vilnius: privatno izdanje, 2011).
[xlviii] Ст. Т. Димитријевић, Стевана Стратимировића, Митрополита Карловачког План за ослобођење српског народа (Београд, 1926), 17−24; М. Ђорђевић, Политичка историја Србије, I, 1804−1813 (Београд, 1956), 19−20.
[xlix] N. Jorga, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches (V. Gotha, 1913), 3.
[l] А. Соловјев, “Непознати кандидат на српски престо год. 1774“, Споменик, XCI (Београд), 120.
[li] М. Ђорђевић, Политичка историја Србије, I, 1804−1813 (Београд, 1956), 20.
[lii] Е. Г. Маретић, Историја српске револуције 1804−1813 (Београд, 1987), 124; С. Новаковић, “Ичков мир. Покушај непосредног измирења Србије и Турске, 1806−1807”, Глас СКА, LXVI (Београд, 1903); М. Гавриловић, Из нове српске историје (Београд, 1926), 93−96; М. Вукићевић, Карађорђе, II (Београд, 1907), 385−387; Р. Љушић, Вожд Карађорђе, I (Смедеревска Паланка, 1993), 191−194.
[liii]Р. Љушић, Кнежевина Србија (1830−1839) (Београд, 1986), 2−3; М. Ђорђевић, Политичка историја Србије, I, 1804−1813 (Београд, 1956), 313−314; Внешнаяя политика России XIX и начала XX века, VI (Москва, 1967). About the Russian-Ottoman Peace Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 and Serbia see in: М. Ђорђевић, Србија у устанку 1804−1813 (Београд: Рад, 1979), 317−328.
[liv] В. С. Караџић, “Срби сви и свуда“, Ковчежић за историју и обичаје Срба сва три закона (Беч, 1849), 1−27; V. B. Sotirović, Srpski komonvelt (Vilnius: privatno izdanje, 2011), 35−71.
[lv] V. B. Sotirović, Srpski komonvelt (Vilnius: privatno izdanje, 2011), 72−86. About Načertanije see in: Р. Љушић, Књига о Начертанију. Национални и државни програм Кнежевине Србије (1844) (Београд: БИГЗ, 1993). About Ilija Garašanin as a statesman and diplomat see in: D. Mackenzie, Ilija Garašanin: Balkan Bizmarck (New York: East European Monographs Boulder, Distributed Columbia University Press, 1985).
Владислав Б. Сотировић
ШУМАДИЈСКИ ПОКРЕТ ОТПОРА
RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OF SHUMADIJA